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## Note on Soviet Fifth Fire Year Plan SURE TO

"Industrial output, as a whole, is to increase during the five years by about 70%, while the output of the producer goods industries is to rise by some 13% a year and consumer goods by some 11% a year. Although the planned increase looks less ambitious than that claimed for the period 1945/50, such is not, in fact, the case because the starting level for the 1945/50 plan was very much lower than that for the 1950/55 plan. A given percentage increase for the 1945/50 plan targets therefore represents a much smaller increase in actual production than for the 1950/55 plan targets. Examination of the individual targets for 1955 which can be converted into real amounts fully bears this out. Selected items are set out in the Annex to this Note.

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"For most industries, particularly such basic industries as power, mining, oil and metallurgy, output is intended to increase more quickly between 1950 and 1955 than between 1945 and 1950.

"This emphasis on the increase of basic production does not augur well for the individual consumer, who will be called on to make greater and greater efforts without a corresponding increase in the standard of living. The increases promised in the supply of consumer goods, even if forthcoming, will still leave the Soviet citizen very poor by Western standards.

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"The ability of the Soviet economy to support a major war will increase, but, by its very nature, this is a long-term not a thert-term matter. If an immediate war of aggression were envisaged, we should expect either the complete withholding of a published plan or much less emphasis on basic projects such as power and raw materials and more attention to manufactured products.

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Selected Targets for 1955 compared with 1945-50 -47

1955 sid!

Increases in Output

		7.	• •		
	UNIT	Terget	1955 Plan <b>ever 1950</b>	1950 Plan over 1945	
Coal	Million tons	373	112	112	
power	Milliard kwh	164	73	46	
011	Million tons	70	32	18	50X1-HUM
Pig Iron	n #	ph	15	10	50X1-HUM
- Crude Ste	el " "	<b>117</b> t	17	15	
Grain	n n	180	56	58	
Raw Cotto	n # #	6	2	3	

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